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t
he commodity price rises that occurred between 2006 and 2008, 
and subsequently during the winter of 2010 to 2011, have attained 
a profile in media and political debates that is higher than that 
reached by these products since the price increases of 1974 and 
1979, which were concurrent with the two oil crises. agricul-
tural price movements on international markets were usually only 
subject to media attention because of apparent relentless decline 
(figure 1). after an optimistic pause in the 1970s, at the turn 
of the century the world, and especially the developing world, 
rediscovered the tribulations of excess. oil itself did not escape 
the curse of abundance, prompting the still famous “Drowning in oil” article in The 
Economist, concerning the inexorable decline of oil’s market price1.
in this context, the 2006-2008 and 2010-2011 crises have a special resonance. 
Both have surprised by their magnitude and abruptness. the imf’s commodity price 
index was set at 100 in 2005, in July 2006 it was raised to 130, in november 2007 
it was more than 157, and by July 2008 it stood at 219; i.e. more than doubling 
within three years. after a decline during the financial crisis, the index rebounded 
and in march 2011 it reached 210. for comparison, the average figure for the period 
from 1992, the year the index was established, until 2004, would be just 60. how 
is it possible that such a phenomenon was not anticipated by politicians, who were 
wholly unprepared for its impact on disposable income, purchasing power and 
1. See “Drowning in oil” and “the next shock” in The Economist, 4 march 1999, in which the British newspaper 









agricultural price volatility has returned to centre stage since 2008. 
Since then, economists and politicians have debated its causes, with bio-
fuels and speculators as two prime suspects. But rather than addressing 
the root of the problem, the political response, from the G20 in particu-
lar, seems focused only on treating its effects.
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inflation; and why was the market itself incapable of anticipating the scarcity? is 
it because the fine adjustment of supply and demand is such an elusive and myste-
rious process, that prices are suddenly able to double or triple in value within a 
few months, even though in many cases markets have been established for more 
than a century, with prices remaining stable or on average declining for periods of 
almost 20 years? 
in a collective response, the G20 countries have taken onboard these two issues 
and focused not on identifying the causes of instability, but on the treatment 
of its effects (Box 1). this approach, to which the realists will give a free rein, 
is motivated firstly, at least officially, by the need for visible action, and by the 
observation that the causes are uncertain and controversial, and therefore diffi-
cult to target. in short, we are facing new crises and the key is to limit their inten-
sity and effects. 
the conclusions of the G20 agriculture ministers were met with a favourable, 
even rapturous, reception. only a few dissenters stressed that key issues had not 
been dealt with and that the delay in addressing the causes would certainly allow 
a deal to be reached, but that it would be an agreement without any real scope. 
for the dissenters, it was of particular significance that trade liberalization had 
been dismissed as potentially culpable, that the role of biofuels had not even been 
Box 1 G20 aGriculture ministers’ responses to market instaBility
at meetings in paris on 22 and 23 
June 2011, G20 agriculture minis-
ters adopted an action plan on food 
price volatility and agriculture. the 
action plan is to be submitted to 
G20 heads of state at the november 
2011 summit in Cannes. the action 
plan has five major elements: 
increase of food production – 
there are commitments to imple-
ment “a broad scope of actions to 
boost agricultural growth”, and 
the strengthening of research and 
innovation with, as a first step, 
the launch of an “international 
research initiative for Wheat 
improvement (iriWi)” to coordi-
nate research efforts on this crop; 
and to encourage and increase 
public and private investment in 
agriculture.
information and market trans-
parency - the G20 will launch, 
within the fao, the “agricul-
tural market information System 
(amiS)” to encourage major 
players in agri-food markets to 
share data, to enhance existing 
information systems, to promote 
greater shared understanding of 
food price developments and to 
promote political dialogue and 
cooperation. this database will be 
implemented “as soon as possible” 
and will be complemented by a 
satellite observing system that 
will share satellite images of agri-
cultural production to enable the 
effects of climate change on world 
agricultural production to be 
accounted for.
international policy coordina-
tion - the action plan recom-
mends the implementation of a 
“rapid response forum” placed 
within the fao. this mechanism 
for immediate action, composed of 
senior G20 officials, will help make 
decisions in the shortest possible 
timescales in the event of a drop 
in supply from a major producer, 
allowing countries to consult and 
respond collectively. any decisions 
made during a crisis will be taken 
within the rapid response forum.
reduce the effects of price vola-
tility for the most vulnerable - 
ministers agreed on the objectives, 
principles, modalities and timing 
of an agriculture and food secu-
rity risk management toolbox, and 
supported the development of a 
proposal for a targeted emergency 
humanitarian food reserves system 
(to complement existing regional 
and national food reserves).
financial regulation – G20 finance 
ministers and Central Bank Gover-
nors are “strongly encouraged” to 
make appropriate decisions for “a 
better regulation and supervision 
of agricultural financial markets”. 
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mentioned, and that the commitments against financial speculation were vague 
and inconsistent2. 
this article balances these two views by first examining the potential causes that 
have been put forward by relevant institutions and stakeholder groups since 2006, 
and then reviewing the state of scientific knowledge on these issues. We start with 
trivial questions: ‘agricultural prices are unstable, so what?’ before examining the 
potential liability of trade liberalization, biofuels and speculation. in conclusion, we 
find that there was no reason for the G20 to exclude or defer the inclusion of the 
latter two factors in their restricted agricultural governance plan. 
AgriculturAl prices Are unstAble, so whAt?
two terms are used alternately to describe market price movements of agricultural 
commodities: instability (of markets) and volatility (of prices). the same measure-
ment method is generally used, which is derived from the financial world, to provide 
information on price dispersion around the average. the greater this dispersion, the 
more frequent the major variations (“major” relative to the average) will be, and the 
greater the market instability and price volatility (Box 2). 
the fact that a market is unstable with volatile prices poses no economic problems 
itself. Such phenomena only become problematic when they are a source of uncer-
tainty and risk for economic operators (producers, investors, buyers…) – a risk so 
significant that these agents modify their behaviour and distance themselves from 
what is both in their own interest and that of the community. Unstable prices may 
not necessarily create risks, either because operators do not perceive the risk in 
question, or because there are means to guard against it – such as through insur-
ance. the state of the world referred to when measuring economic gains and losses 
related to instability is therefore not a world where prices are stable, but a world 
where all risks are insurable. operators are free to insure themselves or not. 
2. this viewpoint was espoused by la Confédération paysanne (peasant Confederation), la Coordination rurale 
(rural Coordination) and moDef. 
Box 2 measurement oF price volatility
the most common measure of long-term volatility or “historical annual-
ized” volatility is obtained by calculating the standard deviation of price 
variations (usually expressed as a logarithm) over a given period, multi-
plied by the square root of the frequency of observations:
volatility = σ√T with σ = 
i=l 
 ri − µ 2 /  n − 1∑n
and rt = ln (Pt) – ln(pt-1), n is the number of observations, � is the mean 
variation of the logarithms of prices (rt) and t is the frequency of obser-
vations (252 for daily data, 12 for monthly data etc).
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When price fluctuations represent uninsurable risks, producers produce less (than 
would otherwise have been produced if the risk was null or insurable), investors 
invest less and consumers consume less (if not necessarily the product in question, 
then other products may be eschewed to meet the need for “products with unstable 
prices”). Ultimately, the consumer is the first loser. indeed, the risk (uninsured) 
linked to instability reduces production and investment (and therefore long-term 
production) compared to a “risk-free” situation. With a constant demand, which 
is the case in agriculture where demand is assumed to be inelastic, i.e. low price 
sensitivity, a lower production will result in higher prices. the consumer there-
fore bears the cost of the risk perceived by the producer by paying more for the 
product (than would have been paid in risk-free situations or with an insured risk). 
the market transfers a part of consumer wellbeing to the producer, via prices that 
on average are higher (compared to a risk-free universe). instability is therefore 
a redistribution mechanism. it should be 
noted that there is another loser: poor 
producers. Such producers are, empirically, 
more risk-averse than rich producers. rich 
producers see profit opportunity in insta-
bility, while poor producers feel the threat 
of bankruptcy and ruin. poor producers are 
therefore more likely to avoid high-risk crops than rich producers, thus guarding 
against the negative effects of instability – lower prices in this case – but will not be 
able to take advantage of the benefits – record-breaking revenues when prices soar. 
Within the production sphere, instability again serves as a redistribution mecha-
nism. redistribution towards the rich in this case.
the significance of this setup is that the risk (not covered) linked to instability 
creates two types of problems: it is a source of inefficiency (higher prices are paid 
on average for products than in a risk-free world) and inequity (it is to the detri-
ment of poor households). But the risk is not universal. insurance mechanisms are 
being developed in some regions (in brief, oeCD and some emerging countries) 
and less in others (lDCs). however, poor rural households occur in higher propor-
tions in areas such as lDCs than in others (oeCD). What is true for households is 
also true at the national scale. agro-exporting countries can gain from instability, 
while agro-importing countries will lose out through bearing the costs of risk, the 
importation of inflation and by having to divert resources and savings towards the 
purchase of food at the expense of other imported products. thus, it appears that 
market instability is primarily an economical problem that affects the poor, which 
may be its only universality. 
does trAde liberAlizAtion mAke mArkets more 
unstAble?
price rises (as distinct from an increase in volatility, which is itself only very relative) 
between 2006 and 2008, and then in 2011, occurred in a context of globalization and 
agro-exporting countries can 
gain from instability, while 
agro-importing countries will 
lose out through bearing the 
costs of risk.
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market liberalization, suggesting that the two phenomena could be related3. this 
idea is not absurd, gaining support from theories that were formulated even before 
the events in question occurred. the problem is that these theories are incompatible.
the first “theory” emphasizes the benefits of agricultural trade liberalization on 
instability. By considering instability as a result of external shocks on the supply or 
demand (weather shocks, but also political shocks or “externalities”, for example 
through the introduction of unilateral measures such as subsidies or export tax), the 
gradual integration of domestic agricultural economies into a large global market 
attenuates price instability through compensation of weather shocks (a good harvest 
somewhere in the world compensates a poor harvest somewhere else) and through 
mitigation of political shocks or “externalities” (a progressive ban on subsidies and 
taxes for example). it could be said that liberalization takes the edge off the shocks. 
this does not mean the resulting prices are stable; in theory, prices are expected 
to be less unstable, in other words, that their distribution becomes closer to estab-
lished laws of probability and that they become insurable under the law of large 
numbers. they are therefore more “stable” in the narrow sense that they are “more 
insurable”. in fact, global prices are generally more “insurable” under classical finan-
cial techniques than domestic prices.
a competing theory is that the beneficial effect of shock compensation that globali-
zation brings is, on average, offset by the negative consequences of the dismantling 
of public policies for the stabilization of domestic prices, which is a consequence of 
globalization. the disappearance of guaranteed price policies that were developed 
in oeCD countries after the Second World War (or shortly beforehand in the United 
States) has increased uncertainty and risk for the producer, who is left exposed to 
market price fluctuations. Without the availability of an insurance mechanism (or 
without wanting to seek recourse to insurance since it requires payment, while 
public policies cost nothing) the producer makes erroneous production decisions by 
producing too much or too little, and so prices are never in equilibrium but adjust 
constantly according to the whim of the producer. instability is endogenous. it creates 
risk, which creates error, which creates instability. 
Both theories are valid. neither can be proven superior by empirical testing. 
however, empirical observations do suggest that, in retrospect, long-term inter-
national prices of most agricultural commodities have never been as unstable as 
during the 1970s (figure 2), which was the golden age of agricultural policies. in 
contrast, most prices have never been as stable as in the 1990s, which was a major 
era of domestic and trade liberalization (lDCs undergoing structural adjustment 
and macSharry’s 1992 Cap reforms). moreover, the observed relationship between 
stability and agricultural policies and trade liberalization has remained true for a 
long time. periods of increased instability (as opposed to price rises) have since 1700 
been associated with periods of restrictions in international trade (Jacks et al. 2010).
3. this argument is particularly salient in the opinions of organizations such as la Confédération paysanne or 
via Campesina. 
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furthermore, we observe that on average agricultural prices are unstable during 
increases and stable when heading downward. Depression is long and steady while 
increases are sudden and condensed. this is a constant of agricultural markets. the 
reason being that when surplus occurs, farmers do not uproot their vines or cocoa 
trees, nor do they put their land into fallow (they hope that their neighbours will), 
thus the downturn spirals. When prices are high, even if hectares are available to 
convert, it takes time for production to react, which according to a producer’s risk 
aversion may be one or two seasons – a precise period overlooked by the market, 
hence leading to instability. the recent phenomenon is not extraordinary when 
considered over the long term; it is in fact quite marginal when compared to events 
in the 1970s.
Can we not find political grounds for the present instability – regardless of its 
relative historical importance? it is worth recalling that in 1994 Wto member 
countries agreed to abandon policies of domestic price stabilization. the objec-
tive being to stabilize revenues, rather than domestic markets. a gradual redirec-
tion of public intervention was intended, away from the setting of a price floor 
towards direct revenue aid – handouts. the 
producer was left alone to manage savings and 
investment choices, like any entrepreneur (in 
reality not exactly like any entrepreneur because 
small businesses do not receive the equivalent of 
20,000 euros in subsidies for a full-time equivalent 
worker, which is the average for oeCD farmers). 
two consequences were expected from liberaliza-
tion: that domestic prices would be more unstable 
(due to the elimination of domestic stabilization policies); and that global prices 
would be more stable in the sense defined above, i.e. more insurable (due to the 
increase in the geographic scope of trade which then reduces “exported” instability 
caused by domestic stabilization policies that lead to surpluses or irregular and 
unpredictable imports onto global markets). Basically, it was expected that insta-
bility would be levelled out and equalized, and that financial instruments (futures 
contracts and options) could be used to limit it. 
the Wto agricultural policies “package” therefore combines trade liberalization, 
subsidies to producers to facilitate the transition, and the use of financial instru-
ments for risk protection. the package is inaccessible to lDCs, which is to be expected 
since the Wto agricultural agreement was neither written by nor aimed at lDCs. 
the management of instability through the natural effect of market expansion and 
of the dismantling of public price stabilization policies in fact discriminates “against” 
households and poor countries that lack access to direct aid or financial instruments 
for risk management. they only have access to external markets, an access that lacks 
sufficient power to stabilize their revenues, which the other two elements of the 
“package” provide. as mentioned above, instability poses a fundamental problem 
of inequality, as does its contemporary management if we consider the “package” 
when prices are high, even 
if hectares are available to 
convert, it takes time for 
production to react, which 
according to a producer’s risk 
aversion may be one or two 
seasons.
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of measures that was institutionalized by the Wto agricultural agreement. even if 
liberalization does not increase the instability of agricultural markets, it does mean 
that poor households are more consistently exposed.
Are bioFuels responsible?
the new link between agricultural commodity markets and energy markets is difficult 
to contest. the rising global need for maize imports was concurrent with that of the 
increase in US domestic demand for maize for ethanol production, which currently 
stands at about 29% of maize consumption in this country. as Collins (2008) empha-
sized, expansion of maize usage for ethanol production has truly accelerated from 
2004/05, with the enactment in the US of the energy policy act during a period of 
a sharp increase in oil prices, which had the explicit objective to increase the share 
of biofuels in the country’s energy “mix”. agricultural markets and energy markets 
are therefore linked due to the anticipation of high oil barrel prices along with the 
US need to secure energy supplies.
Similar concerns occur in europe in the “climate and energy package” adopted by 
the european parliament on 17 December 2008, which stipulates that each member 
State of the Union must meet the 10% target of biofuels in the final energy consump-
tion in transport by 2020. this objective implies that, by the stated date, 60% of 
europe’s consumption of vegetable oil will be for biofuel production (european 
Commission, 2007). retrospective and prospective data collected by Goldman Sachs 
(Currie, 2007) show that in 2004 there was a “spike” in the demand for agricul-
tural products for energy, and the legitimate expectation that an increase in biofuel 
supply would continue.
Considering cereal production as a whole, USDa estimates show that the US 
maize demand for ethanol production accounts for one third of the growth in global 
demand for these commodities (compared to one quarter for animal consumption 
and about 45% for food). for some, these figures put US maize ethanol demand into 
perspective regarding its culpability for the rise in global prices of wheat and other 
cereals – and ultimately in the rise of agricultural prices as a whole.
it is true that aggregate data seems to clear biofuels of blame. according to 
agrimonde (a prospective project led by CiraD and inra) estimations, less than 
5% of the total worldwide production of calories of plant origin is for non-food 
uses, including agrofuels. according to the international energy agency, in 2005 
1% of cultivated land was used to produce agrofuels, replacing 1% of the global 
consumption of fossil fuels. however, the announced rise in the use of cereals for 
agrofuels has increased the attractiveness of the market for financial speculators 
interested in agricultural commodities so that, according to Bricas and Bru (2008), 
“it is more the anticipation of an increase in demand, rather than an actual increase, 
that accounts for the price surge”. furthermore, the use of globally aggregated data 
consistently underestimates the statistical share of north american maize energy 
consumption out of all produced and consumed cereals. according to the same 
authors: “it is not the current volumes of agricultural commodities used for agrofuels 
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that explain the rise in prices, except at a local 
level for US maize providers, who are the 
main producers of these fuels.” the fact that 
US maize prices “surge” due to an increase in 
energetic demand may be sufficient to align 
maize prices in various places of export or 
import across the world, with the price of 
US maize remaining the reference in inter-
national trade. if one accepts the idea that 
prices are established at the marginal value of 
the quantities traded, the price of maize may 
be determined by the price of (US) ethanol, 
even though it only accounts for a small share 
of the aggregate or average consumption globally. 
While rising US maize and cereal prices can be explained by the rapid increase of 
domestic demand for maize for biofuel production, there are discrepancies between 
the different analyses on the contamination effect of rising US prices that reaches 
across the world and spreads to other products. even though the figures are question-
able (especially given the absence of firm counterfactuals), it is important to consider 
the orders of magnitude of the quantitative simulations conducted to determine the 
contribution made by the increased supply of US biofuel maize towards generating 
the global agricultural price surge of 2006-2007 (table 1).  
it is also important to consider that the tension caused by the actual or anticipated 
scarcity of food maize on the north american market has had direct impacts on soy 
and wheat prices, by their replacement in crop rotations, which has contributed to 
the increase and exceptional amplitude of price; even if the exact measurement of 
this contribution is impossible, as is its relative measurement, in the available global 
models. Biofuel policies seem to be the last instrument of national sovereignty in 
agriculture. in the case of “large countries”, their effects go beyond national borders 
and they become objects of multilateral coordination, thus necessitating inclusion 
on the G20 agenda. 
is speculAtion irresponsible? 
in the final version of its Communication on commodities and raw materials on 2 
february 2011, the european Commission acknowledged the existence of a “strong 
correlation between positions on derivative markets and spot prices”. this state-
ment replaces one contained in a previous version that read: “there is no conclusive 
evidence on the causality between speculation in derivatives markets [on the one 
hand] and increased volatility and price increases in the underlying physical markets 
[on the other hand].” to balance nicolas Sarkozy’s demands to regulate speculation 
with angela merkel’s reluctance on this issue, the Commission has used the term 
“strong correlations” as a skilful and prudent compromise, demonstrating the extent 
to which the role of speculation in commodity price instability is both politically 
taBle 1: estimAtions oF the scope oF 
the eFFect oF increAsed us bioFuel 
production on cereAl prices
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sensitive and scientifically controversial. So, is there any empirical evidence for the 
liability, or neutrality, of speculation in terms of causing the spike in commodity 
prices? here we present the most salient reasoning on this subject, produced by 
economics experts since the 2006-2008 spike. 
three observations emerge. the first is that economics does not provide a complete 
and coherent explanatory model of the observed price developments on a given 
market, whether it is “spot” or “futures”. the second observation is that to fill this 
gap, the empirical evidence to blame or exonerate speculation is sparse and often 
contradictory. finally, considering the precautions imposed by the two previous 
points, the temporary and fragile idea seems to prevail that derivatives markets are 
at least partly responsible for the increase of instability. 
whAt hAve we leArned From the 2006-2008 crisis? Speculation is only one factor 
among several that researchers and international institutions have identified as 
causal agents of the increase in prices and the volatility of commodity markets after 
2006. it is also the focus of the media today. the rising profile of the subject is due 
firstly to the hesitancy of economists themselves who, all things being equal, are 
unable to definitively measure the contribution of one variable in isolation from 
others, so that today we are still no closer to establishing the hierarchy of causes that 
has led to the tripling of prices for some products4. Secondly, the general denuncia-
tion of “speculation” following the bursting of the US financial bubble, has mean that 
both subprime speculation and the very ordinary type on wheat or soy futures prices 
have been tarred with the same brush. finally, the uproar created by the July 2008 
testimony of an investment fund manager hasn’t helped the reputation of specula-
tion: in “the accidental hunt Brothers – how institutional investors are Driving 
Up food and energy prices”, michael masters and his co-author adam White firmly 
put the blame on systematic long-only institutional investors (those that always “go 
long”), that speculate on commodity indices such as the Goldman Sachs Commodity 
index or the Dow Jones-aiG Commodity index.
at the heart of the masters and White argument is the fact that the proportion of 
positions taken by index speculators on futures markets has experienced an unprec-
edented rise between 2005 and 2008, during the “spike” in prices. in 1998, physical 
hedgers held 77% of the positions in commodities futures markets, traditional specu-
lators (“non commercial”) accounted for 16% and index speculators 7%. in 2008, 
the proportions were reversed. the physical hedgers (or “commercial”) held 31% of 
positions, traditional speculators 28% and index speculators 41%. this proportion 
approaches 70% on certain products, in particular wheat and livestock (figure 3). 
there were 2.7 million commodities futures contracts bought by index speculators 
4. Credit should be given to Gohin and Dronne (2008) in their attempt to integrate all the potential causes of 
the price rise into one model: “les principaux déterminants de l’évolution des prix agricoles internationaux,” 
mimeo inra. their model, however, fails to explain, as noted by the authors themselves, nearly half of the price 
movements observed.
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between 2003 and 2008, compared to 1.4 million 
by traditional speculators and less than 900,000 for 
hedgers. according to masters and White, there has 
clearly been a bubble.
correlAtion doesn’t prove cAusAtion all is not 
straightforward though. to paraphrase the cautionary 
language of the Commission, the findings of masters 
and White demonstrate correlation, but not causality. 
Work of the french ministry of agriculture has stressed 
in particular that the arrival of index speculators 
precedes the rise in prices by nearly two years, and also 
that the number of open positions (unsettled purchase 
contracts) remained unchanged during the increase. 
Some econometric work on the futures market of the 
Chicago Board of trade suggest a causal relationship 
between index speculation and price inflation in the 
case of soy – but only for soy, thus concluding overall 
that there is only limited evidence that index specula-
tion has caused changes in commodity prices between 
2006 and 2008.
an objective weakness of these works is to associate 
“speculation” with a particular market player – the 
“non commercial” speculator, as opposed to “physical 
hedgers” that supposedly buy and sell futures without 
“speculating”. Buying or selling futures, whether these operations are accompa-
nied by a transaction in the physical market or not, are inherently “speculative”, 
reflecting a bet or a belief about the future development of prices. thus, systemati-
cally “long-only” investor positions have met systematically “short-only” investor 
positions, the fact that the latter are “hedgers” or “commercial” does not exclude 
them from having the intention to speculate. We can just about infer that a system-
atic purchase position, such as that taken by the index investors between 2005 and 
2008, makes the demand for contracts insensitive to price – in economist jargon, 
demand becomes “rigid”. it is known that a rigid demand has a particular ability to 
make the market overreact, because adjustment is no longer made through quanti-
ties (demand for quantities does not vary, whatever the price) but through prices.
a last, more intuitive, element can help comprehend the role of speculation. in 
the current episode of rising commodity prices, a number of causal (or supposedly 
causal) factors that were present in 2006-2008 are absent or seriously attenuated, 
such as: there is presently no particular tension regarding oil, there remains no 
drastic increase in demand from emerging countries or for biofuels, and there are 
no particular fears that a speculative bubble in the assets markets will burst. if there 
is only one causal factor present again this time, it is “speculation”, and perhaps this 
FiGure 3 the growing importAnce oF 
index speculAtors
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one third and two 
thirds of futures 
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made by index 
speculators in 
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less than 10% in 
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is indeed the culprit. instead of reaching this conclusion through intuition, it would 
have been better if we could rely on more consistent evidence. ahead of the next 
crisis, it is vital that economic science, which was caught out this time, makes itself 
useful in a debate that completely evades it at present.
conclusion
are the causes of instability really so elusive that we can justify only focusing on its 
effects? there exists an economic challenge to deal with the causes – according to 
the efficiency argument, any “problem” must be treated at its root. the ability to 
deal with the effects is also morally justified, because the poorest are most at risk. 
it therefore seems that the G20 agriculture ministers choose to favour coordination 
for moral reasons of justice, more than for efficiency. our literature review shows 
that there is a realistic preconception behind such a choice. indeed, no studies have 
isolated one single factor from amongst several, as responsible for the bursts of 
instability experienced by the agricultural markets.
however, there is no reason to exclude the political “disturbances” that the support 
policies for biofuels constitute, especially in north america, or the deregulation 
policies of the agricultural financial markets since the 1990s, especially when the 
rationale behind the current governance of agricultural trade (i.e. the Wto rules) 
is based on the elimination of disturbances in exterior markets, which is created by 
various public policies. the provisional result of the agricultural G20 is inconsistent 
in this respect.
regarding biofuels, as for the agricultural futures markets, the systematic purchase 
of positions has created the conditions for price instability: anticipation errors were 
compounded by a demand that has somehow become more rigid. the globalization of 
trade and the financialisation of markets should have made this demand more elastic 
to the price than it was previously – the agent benefiting from increased opportuni-
ties for arbitrage, buying or selling according to market variation. however, index 
speculators have systematically been buyers. as were the ethanol producers due to 
the subsidies allocated to the sector. the rigidity of demand has amplified the few 
imbalances in production, which in retrospect, were not exceptional and did not 
justify such price movements. n
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